THE WRONG WAR
STOP FIGHTING FOR LOSER AFGHAN GOV'T
OUR troops are performing superbly in Afghanistan. They can seize any objec tive or defeat any enemy on the battlefield. And it doesn't matter.
Using Afghan bases to strike al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan is the right fight. But defending the disastrously corrupt and despised Kabul government is the wrong war.
We've thrown our blood and treasure behind the latter.
Next week, Afghanistan will stage another national election. Given the machinations of President Hamid Karzai, his henchmen and warlord clients, the vote is on track to make Iran's recent balloting look like a model of probity. Even if a dark-horse candidate miraculously unseats Karzai, the result will be further internal polarization, not a sudden blossoming of national unity.
We are witnessing the postmodern take on our Cold War-era policy of supporting strongmen because they were "ours." But the shah of Iran or Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines at least delivered for decades. In Afghanistan, our troops are fighting magnificently to extend the reach of the criminal enterprise known as the Kabul government -- which works against our interests.
One example: A well-placed US official states bluntly that "Karzai's brother in Kandahar is directly benefiting from opium production."
Karzai's sibling is the regional opium czar. And "our man in Kabul" has no interest in interfering. Because the alternative would be for a political opponent to seize control of the opium trade. Eliminate poppies? You'll see bikinis in Afghan villages first.
Is it genuinely to our advantage to send our incomparable soldiers and Marines to give blood for a government of thieves that's despised by the population it loots and neglects?
In recent discussions with military officers, I've found some more optimistic than others. A few see value in our current policies. Others shake their heads. Some defend specific Afghan government departments -- such as the Ministry of Defense -- in which they detect progress. But I haven't found a single defender of Karzai or his government overall. Not one.
Meanwhile, our Marines are engaged in operation Eastern Resolve 2 in Helmand Province, moving with great skill to extend pacification efforts before next week's election.
No one doubts the Marines' combat capabilities: The "devil dogs" know how to bite. The worries I encountered are focused on higher levels -- where this struggle will be won or lost.
Despite some brilliant work by our Special Forces, there's a sense that we're losing the information war -- that the Taliban is whipping a media superpower. Deep generational tensions have arisen between play-it-safe senior commanders and subordinate officers with field experience in information ops. As one source put it, "the real pros are the younger officers who've learned this over time . . . but seniors won't get out of the way and accept any risks."
Brave, capable field officers vs. risk-averse seniors? Must sound familiar to Vietnam vets. Our dirty-boots officers want to win, while too many senior commanders just hope to avoid losing on their watch.
Information warfare requires speed. The Taliban are fast and unscrupulous -- a powerful combination. We agonize over the opinions of staff lawyers before issuing dreary press releases that the Karzai government promptly undercuts. And Washington pols object to US "propaganda," preferring dead soldiers to offended enemies.
In waging the vital information battle, you've got to "git there fustest with the mostest." Far too often, we don't get there at all.
Our troops and officials have other worries as well. We've had a string of targeting successes, culminating in the death of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud last week, but insiders fear that al Qaeda's remnants will move to take control of the reeling Taliban.
As a tough-minded veteran commented, "Our government needs to level with the people and portray radical Islam for what it really is . . . Compartmentalizing this fight into boxes like Afghanistan and Iraq simply cuts off our arms."
Instead, our nervous leaders insist that "Islam is a religion of peace," pretend that Afghanistan has a responsible government, invest $40 billion in aid to line the pockets of thieving Afghan officials -- and fight tactically against enemies with a powerful strategic vision.
Should we squander blood and billions in a mad attempt to make Afghanistan a model state? Or should we concentrate on destroying our enemies, wherever we find them?
Here's what one warrior thinks: "Our business is finding, capturing and killing radicals who, left alone, would conspire and attack our interests and homeland . . . The problem is global."
Our enemies think beyond borders. We've locked ourselves down in the Ozarks of the Orient. Once again, we have heroes on the ground and hustlers in Washington.
Last week, I unfairly compared Vietnam with the muddle in Afghanistan. Our Vietnam War made more sense.
Ralph Peters, NY Post, 8/14/09
